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SoME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSfEM OF
LmGATION. By Edmund Morris Morgan. New York: Columbia University
Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 207. $3.50.
The volume contains six lectures given by Professor Morgan at
Columbia University Law School in the Spring of 1955. They are the
thirteenth series of the James S. Carpentier Lectures established more than
a half century ago. The roster of the lectures begins with James Bryce
in 1904 and includes such distinguished men of the law as John Chipman
Gray, Sir Frederick Pollock, Sir William Holdsworth and Benjamin
Cardozo. Professor Morgan's lectures are designed to direct the attention
of lawyers and judges to some procedural rules which tend to interfere
with a rational investigation of questions of fact in jury trials.
The first lecture traces the development of pleading from the days
of the Year Books through common law pleading, and the Hilary Rules
and Code pleading down to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
author demonstrates how the orthodox rules of pleading obstruct adequate
preparation for trial and suggests that the first step toward making a law•
suit a rational proceeding for discovering the factual basis of a controversy
is the acceptance of the provisions of the federal rules concerning pleading
and discovery.
In the second lecture Professor Morgan deals with the basis of judicial
notice and its place in the judicial process. As in his earlier writings he
takes issue with the two great masters of evidence, James Bradley Thayer
and John Henry Wigmore as to the basis of the doctrine. Contrary to the
expressed views of both he convincingly argues that matters properly judicially noticed are not disputable by evidence. In this position he is supported by the weight of judicial authority despite the fact that learned
jurists such as Hand and Cardozo had approved the Wigmore view in statements unnecessary to decisions at hand. There is a further disagreement
with Wigmore, who felt that judicial notice should be confined to the evi•
dence stage of the trial and other explanations given for other situations
in which the language of judicial notice is used by the courts. Morgan
insists that the doctrine is applicable throughout the judicial process.
A proper use of it will greatly expedite trials, but it should be emphasized
that pretrial proceedings also offer peculiar opportunities for a judicious.
application of the doctrine. And a most salutary function is its use by an
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appella,te court to sustain a judgment in favor of the right party. To
protect against the risk of abuse of the device by opinionated judges
several safeguards have been proposed by both the American Law Institute
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence. These are set forth by the author
who states, "With such guaranties against abuse courts may, to the great
benefit of the public and of litigants, be liberal in the use of judicial
notice." (p. 69)
The third lecture is devoted to functions of judge and jury. Most
discussions of this subject are confined to their respective functions in
determining issues of fact upon which the admissibility of the offered
evidence depends. By means of a number of illustrative cases Professor
Morgan points up the uncertainty and confusion which have been created
by the use of loose and inaccurate terminology in dealing with preliminary
questions affecting the admissibility of evidence. The other and seldom
discussed function has to do with the extent to which the judge decides
·questions of fact in allocating the burden of proof and giving the jury
binding instructions as to the essentials for its discharge. Mr. Morgan
devotes several pages to an attempted elucidation of the matter. It is
now axiomatic that there are two burdens. At the beginning of the trial
the judge must allocate the burden of evidence as to each issue and from
time to time during the trial he may have to determine whether it rests
upon the oi:ie party or the other. When this burden no longer rests upon
either party and the evidence has been closed, the judge must rule upon
the burden of persuasion and be prepared to charge the jury concerning
it. His instruction should clearly inform the jury of the state of mind
which will justify their finding. The usual instruction in civil cases
conveys no intelligible ideas to the jury. The problem is further complicated by including in jury charges statements concerning presumptions
and their effect upon the burden of persuasion. As I have stated elsewhere,1 until this practice is stopped I am convinced that there is little
chance of the jury understanding the judge's instructions.
The last three lectures, almost half of the volume, deal with the history,
theory and application of the hearsay rule. In the fourth lecture the
author has a rather tedious analysis of the process of proof under our
system and the precedents in an attempt to set forth the theory or theories
they purport to apply. In other words, why did the courts purport to
exclude hearsay and under what circumstances did they permit its use?
He concludes, "There is, therefore, no single theory or principle which
will lend any element of consistency to the decisions governing hearsay and·
its exceptions. The whole subject needs reconsideration. The Uniform
Law Commissioners have issued a proposed set of rules, which have been
approved by the American Bar Association and the American Law Instil Ray, "Presumptions and the Uniform Rules of Evidence," 33 Troe:. L. REv. 588 at
602 (1955).
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tute. They do much toward making the rule and its exceptions more
nearly consistent and more effective as means for a practical rational solution of issues of fact. They deserve study with a view to action by both
Bench and Bar." (p. 140)
The fifth lecture is designed to ascertain how the actual practice in
applying the rules of hearsay comport with the theory set forth in the
preceding lecture. A reader may be a little annoyed by the repetition
at the beginning of the chapter but this was probably desirable in the case
of oral presentation at various intervals to different audiences. Again
after a somewhat tiresome review of the authorities the author concludes:
" . • . our modern courts in dealing with hearsay, while giving lip service to the reasons which impelled their predecessors to create the rule,
have in fact entirely disregarded them. The oath and opportunity for
cross-examination, and even oath and actual cross-examination do not save
the utterance from exclusion as hearsay; the absence of both does not
require its exclusion. The decisions indicate a realization that emphasis
upon the theoretical value of oath and cross-examination as instruments
for the discovery of truth (a) has obscured the limits of their value in
day-to-day practice in ordinary litigation, and (b) has created an entirely
unrealistic assumption of naive credulity of jurors and their incapacity
to evaluate hearsay as distinguished from firsthand testimony. The test
of admissibility which seems to me to be applied in most of the exceptions is this: 'Is the evidence offered of such a quality that a trier of
fact, and particularly a modem jury, could put upon it a reasonably
accurate value as tending to prove the truth of the proposition which it
is offered to prove?'" (pp. 166-167) Professor Morgan again calls for a serious
consideration by the profession of the proposals of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence.
The final lecture is concerned with the effect of the hearsay rule in
conjunction with other exclusionary rules. Usually courts are concerned
only with whether the particular evidence falls within a certain rule.
There is seldom any consideration of the question whether the application
of the rule will or will not produce a sensible result, or whether the evidence
has more probative force or more indicia of verity than other evidence
unquestionably admissible and possibly already admitted in the case.
In this lecture the author has very effectively used a hypothetical personal
injury case, carrying it through the trial with the introduction of numerous
pieces of evidence. He is able to demonstrate that in this particular situation of all the available evidence from eye witnesses only certain hearsay
statements made under the weakest substitute for cross-examination were
admissible. The most reliable and persuasive items were inadmissible
under the accepted rules, a result which would shock most laymen and
a large part of the legal profession if it really understood the operation
of the rules.
No living scholar is better qualified than Professor Morgan to point
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up and dramatize the deficiencies of the present rules of evidence to
contribute to an efficient and just disposition of lawsuits. He brings to
the task a lifetime of experience gained in practice, teaching, investigation,
and writing in this field. This small volume deserves a much wider
audience among the legal profession than it will probably receive. Far
too often lawyers have shown too little interest in serious effort toward
improvement of rules of evidence, and unless an unforeseen miracle is
in the offing Professor Morgan's words will have fallen on barren soiL
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